But over the past 10-15 years, I think we’ve gotten saddled with a pretty fallen and perverse version of it. The trade deal was supposed to be a political vehicle for overcoming special interest politics, but it’s really just become another venue for interest group politics. Read, for example, this account of U.S. efforts to use trade agreements to coerce foreign governments into paying higher prices for pharmaceutical products.Matt was in high school when the Uruguay Round trade agreement was signed in 1994, so it's understandable why he's overlooking how the U.S. pharmaceutical, entertainment, publishing, and software industries created the so-called Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property. Still, he really should read Susan Sell's Private Power, Public Law to see how industry placed such draconian laws into the TRIPS agreement that even free-trade icon Jagdish Bhagwati harshly criticized it in In Defense of Globalization as a terrible deal for developing countries. Agreeing to TRIPS, as noted by Sell, was what developing countries had to give up to get industrialized countries to end their hypocritical quotas on textile exports from developing countries, the Multi Fiber Agreement.
The new example in Matt's link of bullying by intellectual property industries concerns the Trans Pacific Partnership, which would ban government health services from negotiating prices with pharmaceutical companies. This follows on the Anti Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, which requires countries to institute criminal penalties for all kinds of counterfeiting, while nowhere mentioning "fair use." The U.S. Trade Representative is claiming the executive branch can enter into without Congressional action, something disputed by Senator Ron Wyden. NAFTA and the Uruguay Round agreement (which created the World Trade Organization) were both passed as legislation in the U.S., as opposed to being considered treaties requiring a 2/3 vote in the Senate. ACTA has not been considered by Congress at all, even though it is obviously an international agreement.
TRIPS lengthened patent terms around the world, including in the U.S. (from 17 to 20 years), something Congress had repeatedly voted down when considered on a stand-alone basis. But in the all-or-nothing "fast track" procedure used for the Uruguay Round legislation, Congress had no choice but to accept it if it wanted the other parts of the agreement. With the ACTA and now TPP negotiations, the pharmaceutical and other industries are trying to make it impossible to undo their gains from TRIPS.