How Transfer Pricing Hurts the Middle Class

One of the basic building blocs for understanding the effect of tax havens is the mechanism by which profits show up in the havens rather than the countries where they are really earned. This tool is known as “transfer pricing,” which at its most basic is simply the centralized setting of prices for transactions between two subsidiaries of the same company. The fact that intra-corporate sales make up much of world trade (estimates range between 33% and 60%) means that how the prices are set can have a huge economic impact.

When one subsidiary of a multinational company sells something to another one, the price for the good or service is not set in a market. A Ford transmission will not work in a Chevrolet, so there is no independent buyer for products like that. But for Ford Motor Company to know how well its various entities are doing, it has to have prices attached to intra-corporate sales. The pricing system is centralized, and can be used for multiple purposes; the most interesting for our purposes is shifting profits into lower tax jurisdictions. The charts below show how this works. In the example, it is the price of the transmission that is set via transfer pricing for the sale of French-made transmissions for use in final assembly in the U.K. All numbers are arbitrary.

	Ford France		Ford UK
		Price of car	15000
Price of transmission	1000	Price of transmission	1000
Cost of production	500	All other costs	12000
Pre-tax profit	500	Pre-tax profit	2000
Tax at 40%	200	Tax at 20%	400
Post-tax profit	300	Post-tax profit	1600

Total post-tax profit: $1900

	Ford France		Ford UK
		Price of car	15000
Price of transmission	600	Price of transmission	600
Cost of production	500	All other costs	12000
Pre-tax profit	100	Pre-tax profit	2400
Tax at 40%	40	Tax at 20%	480
Post-tax profit	60	Post-tax profit	1920

Total post-tax profit: $1980

We have the same car, the same final selling price, the same cost of production, the same pre-tax profit. But by reducing how much Ford France charged Ford UK for the transmission, profit was shifted into the lower tax country (in this example, the UK). Post-tax profit increased by the change in sales price ($400) times the difference in the tax rate (20%).

Of course, it is not like tax authorities don't know that shenanigans like this can arise. But it can be hard to detect it even if you're looking for it. Richard Caves' Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis provides a good overview of many research studies, which have found that it easier to get away with abusive transfer pricing when there is no real arm's length market for the good. For example, there is obviously a large market for spark plugs, so it's relatively easy to see if the price a company assigns for their sale between subsidiaries makes sense. On the other hand, there is frequently no market for a company's patents, because it often does not want to license them to other firms because they are a source of competitive advantage. That explains why Microsoft put patents in an Irish subsidiary where the royalties are untaxed: there is no good way to determine if the prices charged to other subsidiaries for their use is a reasonable one or not.

We see, then, that by a relatively simple mechanism a company can make its profits show up in lower tax jurisdictions. As previous columns discussed, most multinationals have a substantial network of subsidiaries in tax havens to reduce the taxes they pay in the U.S. and other developed countries. Their reduction, of course, means higher taxes for us, higher deficits, program cuts, or some combination of the three.

My next post will deal with how to combat tax havens.

How Profitable Fortune 500 Companies Save $70 Billion a Year in Taxes

A new report by Citizens for Tax Justice and its sister organization, the Institute for Taxation and Economic Policy (h/t Dirt Diggers Digest), documents the extent to which the Fortune 500 is able to skate around the tax system and pay far less than its fair share. The study covers 280 firms in the F500 that had pre-tax profits in the U.S. every year from 2008 to 2010, excluding companies that reported "ridiculous" geographic allocations of their pre-tax profits

Between subsidies, stock options, indefinite deferral of taxes on income earned abroad, apparently abusive transfer pricing, skillful use of tax havens, and aggressive tax shelters (which can only be identified after the fact), these companies reduced the amount of their global income that was taxable in the United States, and slashed the amount paid on their U.S. taxable income by over $70 billion per year. That is, the difference between what these companies would have paid at the 35% corporate income tax on their $1.4 trillion in U.S. profits over those three years, and what they actually paid, came to $222.7 billion.

This only scratches the surface. Note that this is only the companies' U.S. income--which has already been reduced by transfer pricing, making profits show up in low-tax foreign jurisdictions. The report singles out Google and Microsoft because "almost all or even more than all of their pretax profits were reported as foreign, even though most of their revenues and assets were in the United States." In Microsoft's case, as I report in my latest book, one of its subsidiaries in Ireland had $16 billion in patent assets but almost no employees, draining royalties from the U.S. to Ireland for booking purposes. U.S. companies do not pay taxes on their foreign earnings until they are brought back to the United States. As the CTJ/ITEP report points out, if the U.S. stopped taxing foreign earnings, as for example, Herman Cain and Rick Perry advocate, this would create even bigger incentives to declare profits overseas rather than in this country.

Considering U.S. taxes only, the report shows that 30 companies paid negative tax rates on their 2008-10  domestic income, with General Electric having negative taxes in all three years, receiving $4.7 billion in tax refunds despite $10.5 billion in U.S. pre-tax income.

As I have emphasized repeatedly, what one group does not pay in taxes means higher taxes on others, greater deficits, or budget cuts. One way or the other, those of us who do pay our taxes are harmed by those who do not. This report does a great job spotlighting the worst offenders. In posts in the near future, I will discuss how transfer pricing works, and ways to tackle tax havens.

Poll Results: Anti Counterfeiting Trade Agreement

The poll is now closed.

Had you heard of the Anti Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) before today?

Yes: 1
No: 9

No surprise here; the agreement is not well known. But as I argued in the related post, this treaty, if it withstands constitutional challenge, will increase the cost of medications in many countries by taking away the ability of government health agencies to negotiate with drug companies for lower prices.

Tax Havens Cost the Middle Class Untold Billions

As I argued yesterday, when taxes are reduced for one group, government must raise taxes on someone else, run bigger deficits, or cut programs. Tax havens, jurisdictions with strong secrecy provisions and low or zero tax rates, are one way that rich individuals and corporations reduce their tax payments, both legally and illegally. A recent book by Ronen Palan, Richard Murphy, and Christian Chavagneux summarizes the latest work on tax havens and contends that they form a central part of the global economy. Tax Havens: How Globalization Really Works presents data that 30% of multinational corporations' foreign direct investment passes through tax havens like Bermuda, Ireland, or Luxembourg, overwhelmingly for tax purposes. Tax havens, then, are far more central to the global economy than we generally suppose.

How much does this cost average taxpayers? In a separate report, Murphy calculated that wealthy individuals have roughly $11.5 trillion in tax havens, which at a 7.5% rate of return would generate $860 billion in income each year. If, on average, these people faced a 30% marginal tax, that would come to $255 billion annually that the rich avoid in taxes. Needless to say, this is a best guess, since the value of these assets is not disclosed publicly. See his report for more details on how he generated those figures.

That's just individuals. The situation with corporations is murkier still. While corporations set up subsidiaries in tax havens for the obvious purpose of reducing their tax, Palan et al. say there is no solid estimate of the overall cost of these activities. The Government Accountability Office reported in 2008 that of the largest 100 U.S. companies, 86 had subsidiaries abroad, and 83 of these had subsidiaries in tax havens. Bank of America had 115 subsidiaries in tax havens, including 59 in the Cayman Islands. Citigroup had a whopping 427 tax haven subsidiaries, including 91 in Luxembourg and 90 in the Cayman Islands. Goldman Sachs only had 29, 15 in the Cayman Islands.

I mention the Cayman Islands because President Obama has long been a critic of tax havens, saying during the 2008 campaign of Ugland House in the Cayman Islands, "Either this is the largest building in the world or the largest tax scam in the world. And I think the American people know which it is." Palan et al. report that the Caymans are the sixth largest financial center in the world, with $1.9 trillion in assets in December 2007. However, since taking office, the President has not succeeded in passing a version of the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, which in its original form he co-sponsored with Carl Levin, Norm Coleman, Ken Salazar and Sheldon Whitehouse.

Tax havens could not exist without the financial services industry, which provides the tax lawyers, accountants, and other professionals who make it possible for the rich and corporations to reduce their taxes. Collectively, they and their clients are the 1%. Occupy Wall Street has highlighted the abuses benefiting them, and tax havens are most definitely part of their pattern of abuse. Tax havens have proved amazingly resilient, however, and it will take sustained political pressure to shut them down.

How to Read a Republican Tax Proposal

We've been hearing about Herman Cain's 9-9-9 Plan for a few weeks and now Governor Rick Perry has released his tax proposal, supposedly a 20% flat tax. We will undoubtedly hear more as the Presidential campaign kicks into higher gear. As a public service, I am providing a simple way to understand the impact of these tax plans.

Step 1: Assume revenue neutrality.

Don't laugh; Cain's “9-9-9 Scoring Report” claims to be revenue neutral and Perry says he will keep federal revenue at 18% of gross domestic product. 

Step 2: Look at what income is no longer taxed.

For example, the 9-9-9 Plan “features zero tax on capital gains and repatriated profits,” eliminates the estate tax, and cuts the corporate income tax from 35% to 9%, while Rick Perry's tax plan eliminates taxes on capital gains, dividends, Social Security, estates, repatriated profits, and cuts the corporate income tax from 35% to 20%.

Step 3: Determine how much of that income you have.

If you're not rich, you've got very little of it, except Social Security in the Perry plan. If you're not retired, you'll get virtually no reductions under either plan.

Step 4: Ask what taxes have to be raised to get to revenue neutrality.

Step 5: Look in the mirror to see who pays them.

Comments: As I argued in Competing for Capital, if you cut one group's tax burden, one of three things has to happen to offset the reduction: someone else's tax burden increases, government runs higher deficits, or programs must be cut. If you maintain revenue neutrality, the first of these options is the only one possible, as flat tax pioneers Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka admitted as far back as 1983: “It is an obvious mathematical law that lower taxes on the successful will have to be made up by higher taxes on average people” (h/t James Carville, We're Right, They're Wrong).

But in fact, Perry's proposal clearly is not revenue neutral. How could it be, when people have the option of filing under the current tax system or his new system? People who would pay more under the new plan would pay under the old plan and people who would save money under the new plan would pay under the new plan: this necessarily means less revenue. Rich people would save quite a bit of money, as Seth Hanlon at Think Progress has shown. Using published tax returns of famous people and the tax form on the Perry website, he shows that Warren Buffett's tax rate would fall from 11% to 0.2%, former Vice-President Cheney's rate would drop from 19.1% to 6.4%, President Obama would get a $60,000 tax cut, and Governor Perry's rate would fall from 18.6% to 15.8%.

Similarly, Cain's 9-9-9 Plan would raise far less than current taxes do, even as it increases taxes on the middle class and the poor. Michael Linden at Think Progress estimates that it would only bring in 14% of gross domestic product, well below the current low revenue that's giving us a $1 trillion deficit. In addition, many analysts think his corporate income tax is actually a value-added tax in disguise (h/t Michael Linden).

 The bottom line is that if we cut taxes for the wealthy and corporations, it will impact the budget elsewhere, in some combination of tax increases on the middle class, program cuts, and deficit increases. Regardless of the spin surrounding these and other tax plans that may come down the pike, if a proposal reduces some taxes but doesn't reduce your taxes, you will lose out via these three methods of compensating for the lost revenue.

Great catch by Yglesias on U.S. intellectual property bullying

In the middle of a fairy tale about how trade deals are a vehicle for overcoming special interest opposition to foreign competition, Matt Yglesias hits on what he sees as the exception, but is actually the rule:

But over the past 10-15 years, I think we’ve gotten saddled with a pretty fallen and perverse version of it. The trade deal was supposed to be a political vehicle for overcoming special interest politics, but it’s really just become another venue for interest group politics. Read, for example, this account of U.S. efforts to use trade agreements to coerce foreign governments into paying higher prices for pharmaceutical products.

Matt was in high school when the Uruguay Round trade agreement was signed in 1994, so it's understandable why he's overlooking how the U.S. pharmaceutical, entertainment, publishing, and software industries created the so-called Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property. Still, he really should read Susan Sell's Private Power, Public Law to see how industry placed such draconian laws into the TRIPS agreement that even free-trade icon Jagdish Bhagwati harshly criticized it in In Defense of Globalization as a terrible deal for developing countries. Agreeing to TRIPS, as noted by Sell, was what developing countries had to give up to get industrialized countries to end their hypocritical quotas on textile exports from developing countries, the Multi Fiber Agreement.

The new example in Matt's link of bullying by intellectual property industries concerns the Trans Pacific Partnership, which would ban government health services from negotiating prices with pharmaceutical companies. This follows on the Anti Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, which requires countries to institute criminal penalties for all kinds of counterfeiting, while nowhere mentioning "fair use." The U.S. Trade Representative is claiming the executive branch can enter into without Congressional action, something disputed by Senator Ron Wyden. NAFTA and the Uruguay Round agreement (which created the World Trade Organization) were both passed as legislation in the U.S., as opposed to being considered treaties requiring a 2/3 vote in the Senate. ACTA has not been considered by Congress at all, even though it is obviously an international agreement.

TRIPS lengthened patent terms around the world, including in the U.S. (from 17 to 20 years), something Congress had repeatedly voted down when considered on a stand-alone basis. But in the all-or-nothing "fast track" procedure used for the Uruguay Round legislation, Congress had no choice but to accept it if it wanted the other parts of the agreement. With the ACTA and now TPP negotiations, the pharmaceutical and other industries are trying to make it impossible to undo their gains from TRIPS.

Forbes 400 has collected plenty of subsidies

Dirt Diggers Digest has a good post up about how various members of the Forbes 400 have received plenty of government subsidies. Echoing Elizabeth Warren, Phil Mattera writes:

Accumulating a great fortune requires, among other things, a legal system oriented to property rights, a tax system biased in favor of investment income, and government spending on infrastructure ranging from interstate highways to the internet.

 He gives numerous examples of how the 1% have received subsidies on top of these general government provisions. Bill Gates' Microsoft received $32 million in Texas for a data center in Bexar County. Warren Buffett's General Re, an insurance company owned by Berkshire Hathaway, got $28.5 million in various subsidies simply to relocate from one place in Stamford, CT, to another, creating no new jobs. Michael Dell's self-named firm got $242 million (nominal value) from North Carolina for a computer manufacturing facility which closed less than five years later.

As I show in my report for the Global Subsidies Initiative, "Investment Incentives: Growing Use, Uncertain Benefits, Uneven Controls" (free download), Dell received millions more in the U.S. and Canada for call centers, most if not all of which are now closed. The company received millions more in Europe, including a controversial 54.5 million euro subsidy to relocate its computer manufacturing from Ireland to Poland in 2009. (Subsidized relocations are a rarity in the European Union, and I was shocked that the European Commission approved this; when I spoke to them in Brussels in January on my book Investment Incentives and the Global Competition for Capital, most of the Q&A was about my criticism of their decision.)

Mattera gives many more examples, even though he only gets down to #18 of the 400. His basic point is on the money: the richest Americans have exploited government subsidies both here and abroad to grow their fortunes, and the 99% are right to be upset about it. As I've emphasized before, we could more than pay for all government layoffs at the local and state level if we could find a way to end these giveaways.