As I have written before, when states announce a major new investment, it is far more likely that the announced subsidy is an underestimate than an overestimate. A new Good Jobs First study commissioned by the United Auto Workers unearths a new example of this, which I believe is the largest underestimate ever: Nissan in Mississippi.
When Nissan announced in 2000 that it had chosen Madison County, Mississippi, just north of Jackson, as the site for a new assembly facility, it was reported that the project had received $295 million in subsidies (at a present value of $289.7 million, as I calculated in Investment Incentives and the Global Competition for Capital). The project also was given the power of eminent domain, and while one family succeeded in avoiding condemnation, it no doubt weighed on voters when they overwhelmingly passed an eminent domain reform initiative in 2011.
It turns out, as Good Jobs First reports, that the announcements left a few things out. While the $295 million package was passed by the state legislature in a one-day session (North Carolina does this sort of thing, too), the project was also receiving incentives from Madison County, and the city of Canton agreed not to annex the plant for 30 years. In addition, it was eligible for huge subsidies under existing Mississippi programs, including Jobs Tax Credits, reductions in its business franchise tax, personal property and sales tax exemptions, as well as Advantage Jobs, which lets employers keep up to 90% of workers' state tax withholdings. This is a type of subsidy of which Good Jobs First is highly critical, as is David Cay Johnston.
Just how much was left out? $867 million, as follows:
Jobs tax credits: $400 million over 20 years
Franchise tax reduction: $72 million over 20 years
Advantage Jobs: $160 million over 20 years
County infrastructure: $25 million
County property tax abatement: $210 million over 30 years
Not only that, but Nissan received a further $68 million for an expansion in 2002, plus about $13 million in miscellaneous subsidies more recently. Finally, Good Jobs First estimates that the state had to spend about $90 million to finance the bonds for the infrastructure at the beginning of the project.
The report notes that employment is around 4500. Counting all the subsidies, but omitting the $90 million for financing, that comes to about a nominal value of $276,000 per job, more than the usual assembly plant project. In addition, about 20% of the jobs there are held by temporary workers, making the value of the project less than if all workers were directly employed by Nissan.
No doubt some of this information was available before. But the fact that it's taken over 12 years to get a full accounting of the costs of the project--and that the subsidy for the initial phase was almost three times the amount advertised--provides a stark warning about how difficult it is to have adequate oversight and accountability for even projects that receive a great deal of press coverage.
Showing posts with label eminent domain. Show all posts
Showing posts with label eminent domain. Show all posts
Thursday, May 23, 2013
Thursday, November 10, 2011
Mississippi's Eminent Domain Reform Initiative Passes with 73%
While national attention focused on the defeat of the "personhood" initiative in Mississippi on Tuesday, voters there approved Initiative 31, an amendment to the state constitution that bans the use of eminent domain to transfer property from one private owner to another (h/t Jim Roos, Missouri Eminent Domain Abuse Coalition) with 73% of the vote.
Eminent domain, where government takes private property for public use, is regulated by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which says, "...nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." The issue of what constitutes a "public use" has been expanded by court decisions over several decades, with the U.S. Supreme Court's 5-4 ruling in Kelo v. City of New London that economic development qualifies as a public use, even when the property is being transferred to a different private owner.
Eminent domain is heavily entwined with economic development subsidies, in particular tax increment financing. Removing "blight" is often a reason a government can resort to eminent domain, and some variant of blight must be shown in most states to allow the use of tax increment financing. I argued in Competing for Capital that fighting subsidies often attracts "strange bedfellows" coalitions, because they can be criticized on efficiency, equity, and environmental grounds, potentially pulling opponents to subsidies from across the ideological spectrum.
For similar reasons, we see unusual political coalitions fighting private-to-private eminent domain. For one thing, these cases usually involve subsidies, as did Kelo. People understandably don't want to lose their homes, but they are especially incensed if they are losing their homes to enrich a company or private developer. Moreover, such cases can heavily impact minority communities (if property values are lower there) and small businesses (especially if compensation only takes property value into account, but not the value of the ongoing business). In Mississippi, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the National Federation of Independent Businesses filed a joint amicus brief with the state supreme court to keep Initiative 31 on the ballot, represented by the libertarian Institute for Justice. Talk about strange bedfellows!
This coalition can break down, however. As Ilya Somin at the Volokh Conspiracy points out, when eminent domain reform is paired with other measures, it often fails. He gives the examples of Proposition 98 in California, which included rent control restrictions, and Proposition 90, which included "regulatory takings" provisions (these limit government ability to adopt new regulations). Understandably, those additions saw off the liberal wing of the eminent domain reform coalition. "By contrast," he says, "all twelve 'clean' anti-Kelo measures have passed, usually by lopsided margins..." The Institute for Justice, however, does push "regulatory takings" provisions. To its credit, it did not demand them as a price for defending Initiative 31 in court.
With the passing of Initiative 31, Mississippi has given subsidy opponents leverage as well as protecting property owners from having to transfer their property to private developers, which often translates into an additional subsidy.
Eminent domain, where government takes private property for public use, is regulated by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which says, "...nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." The issue of what constitutes a "public use" has been expanded by court decisions over several decades, with the U.S. Supreme Court's 5-4 ruling in Kelo v. City of New London that economic development qualifies as a public use, even when the property is being transferred to a different private owner.
Eminent domain is heavily entwined with economic development subsidies, in particular tax increment financing. Removing "blight" is often a reason a government can resort to eminent domain, and some variant of blight must be shown in most states to allow the use of tax increment financing. I argued in Competing for Capital that fighting subsidies often attracts "strange bedfellows" coalitions, because they can be criticized on efficiency, equity, and environmental grounds, potentially pulling opponents to subsidies from across the ideological spectrum.
For similar reasons, we see unusual political coalitions fighting private-to-private eminent domain. For one thing, these cases usually involve subsidies, as did Kelo. People understandably don't want to lose their homes, but they are especially incensed if they are losing their homes to enrich a company or private developer. Moreover, such cases can heavily impact minority communities (if property values are lower there) and small businesses (especially if compensation only takes property value into account, but not the value of the ongoing business). In Mississippi, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the National Federation of Independent Businesses filed a joint amicus brief with the state supreme court to keep Initiative 31 on the ballot, represented by the libertarian Institute for Justice. Talk about strange bedfellows!
This coalition can break down, however. As Ilya Somin at the Volokh Conspiracy points out, when eminent domain reform is paired with other measures, it often fails. He gives the examples of Proposition 98 in California, which included rent control restrictions, and Proposition 90, which included "regulatory takings" provisions (these limit government ability to adopt new regulations). Understandably, those additions saw off the liberal wing of the eminent domain reform coalition. "By contrast," he says, "all twelve 'clean' anti-Kelo measures have passed, usually by lopsided margins..." The Institute for Justice, however, does push "regulatory takings" provisions. To its credit, it did not demand them as a price for defending Initiative 31 in court.
With the passing of Initiative 31, Mississippi has given subsidy opponents leverage as well as protecting property owners from having to transfer their property to private developers, which often translates into an additional subsidy.
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