In what may end up as the biggest economic development failure in U.S. history, Foxconn announced Wednesday that its $10 billion Wisconsin factory will not be a factory. Instead, the company says, it will still create 13,000 jobs, but these will be research jobs rather than manufacturing ones. I'll believe it when I see it.
Accompanied by an almost $4.8 billion subsidy package as estimated by Good Jobs First (follow the link to the spreadsheet), the project was heavily criticized even before it was announced in 2017 (my take here and here). The massive subsidy helped normalize the idea of multi-billion investment incentives and gave Amazon a handy benchmark for its own effort to break the bank.
As I analyzed a year and a half ago, it didn't make sense to manufacture electronics in the United States when everything was cheaper in China, unless you were worried about access to the U.S. market. The illegitimate Trump regime had already created an unpredictable and protectionist trade climate, and this was long before the trade war with China really took off. If Foxconn felt it had to locate in the United States, the country was in a strong bargaining position, but by playing the states off against each other, it was still possible for a foreign company to score huge subsidies.
What happens next? As noted, Foxconn still says it will build a huge facility and hire 13,000 workers. But in 2018, it failed to meet its job creation target and forfeited what would have been a $9.5 million subsidy. I predict we will see more such failures from Foxconn until it finally pulls the plug. Indeed, on January 31, Good Jobs First called for the immediate cancellation of the deal, with the company financially responsible for expenses made by the state and by Racine County in connection with the project. This would be a fair resolution of the situation, appropriately leaving egg on the faces of the deal's promoters, the recently defeated Governor Scott Walker and the head of the illegitimate Trump regime.
As you see, I have managed to steer clear of the obvious puns. Instead, I invite you to insert your joke here.
UPDATE: Foxconn now says that it will indeed still build a factory, citing a conversation between CEO Terry Gou and Trump (h/t commenter Joel at Angry Bear). This is certainly clear as mud. As others have pointed out, several promised investments from Foxconn have failed to materialize at anywhere near the scale promised, including in Brazil, Pennsylvania, Indonesia, Vietnam, and India. So I am going to remain skeptical on what was a terrible deal in the first place.
Cross-posted at Angry Bear.
Showing posts with label Wisconsin. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Wisconsin. Show all posts
Friday, February 1, 2019
Thursday, August 10, 2017
Why subsidize protectionism motivated foreign investors?
The already infamous case of Foxconn in Wisconsin illustrates a dynamic we are likely to witness more before we are rid of the illegitimate Trump regime. One of the regime's hallmarks has been a set of unpredictable trade policies with a definite protectionist tilt. The United States was withdrawn from the Trans Pacific Partnership agreement on January 23. On May 19, the regime officially announced it would renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
If you're a company dependent on exports to the United States, these are worrisome developments. Given that the country had $2.7 trillion in imports and an overall trade deficit of $502.3 billion in 2016, there are quite a few companies dependent on exporting to the United States. Therefore, the environment is threatening for them at present.
The classic response, as I wrote before, is to protect access to the U.S. market by making your product in the United States. This is what foreign automakers did in the 1980s, in the face of so-called "voluntary export restraints" on Japanese cars. Being committed to a particular site means that a company's bargaining power with the host government is sharply reduced. However, thanks to U.S. federalism, all is not lost for a company that really needs to locate in the United States.
Since each state has access to large revenues and budgets, and because the U.S. Constitution has not been interpreted to mean that location incentives violate the Commerce Clause (read: Cuno v. Daimler-Chrysler), state and local governments are able to reward companies for doing something they would have done anyway: Come to the United States. Even in the Foxconn case, where the firm obviously wanted to be in House Speaker Paul Ryan's district, it created the illusion that it might go elsewhere, which was all it had to do to get Wisconsin to cough up an obscene $3+ billion subsidy. (We won't know how much in total until we find out the cost for local tax increment financing.)
How can this happen? Probably the two biggest reasons are that the company is mobile, especially when it hasn't committed any money yet, and that there is a tremendous information asymmetry working against governments. Lots more information is available on governments and their officials than is available about a company and its true preferences. Even when a corporation is strongly telegraphing its preferred site, you never can be 100% sure that site will be the winner, or that it will be the winner even if it gives no investment incentives. Corporations make up competing sites even when there aren't any (a site location consultant tells me he always recommends that; see Competing for Capital). They exploit their information advantage well. As a result, governments give them investment attraction subsidies and the average taxpayer pays for it.
How do we know that Foxconn is coming to the United States because it is worried about protectionism? Because it made no economic sense for Foxconn to build here otherwise. There are good reasons Foxconn makes all iPhones in China: land, labor, and just about everything else are way less expensive than in the United States, *and* provincial and municipal governments will give them generous location incentives to favor one over the other. You can't beat that with a stick. But you can beat it if market access is in question.
As long as U.S. protectionism remains ascendant, a growing number of foreign companies will follow Foxconn and hedge their bets to guarantee access to the U.S. market. Due to fiscal federalism, however, the potential advantages from foreign investment (which may not be that great, depending on job losses at existing competitors' facilities) will be diluted or even overwhelmed by the amount of subsidies the newcomers receive. State and local governments need to resist temptation -- to be more precise, we need to find a way politically to make them resist temptation.
H/t to Greg LeRoy for suggesting this article.
Cross-posted at Angry Bear.
If you're a company dependent on exports to the United States, these are worrisome developments. Given that the country had $2.7 trillion in imports and an overall trade deficit of $502.3 billion in 2016, there are quite a few companies dependent on exporting to the United States. Therefore, the environment is threatening for them at present.
The classic response, as I wrote before, is to protect access to the U.S. market by making your product in the United States. This is what foreign automakers did in the 1980s, in the face of so-called "voluntary export restraints" on Japanese cars. Being committed to a particular site means that a company's bargaining power with the host government is sharply reduced. However, thanks to U.S. federalism, all is not lost for a company that really needs to locate in the United States.
Since each state has access to large revenues and budgets, and because the U.S. Constitution has not been interpreted to mean that location incentives violate the Commerce Clause (read: Cuno v. Daimler-Chrysler), state and local governments are able to reward companies for doing something they would have done anyway: Come to the United States. Even in the Foxconn case, where the firm obviously wanted to be in House Speaker Paul Ryan's district, it created the illusion that it might go elsewhere, which was all it had to do to get Wisconsin to cough up an obscene $3+ billion subsidy. (We won't know how much in total until we find out the cost for local tax increment financing.)
How can this happen? Probably the two biggest reasons are that the company is mobile, especially when it hasn't committed any money yet, and that there is a tremendous information asymmetry working against governments. Lots more information is available on governments and their officials than is available about a company and its true preferences. Even when a corporation is strongly telegraphing its preferred site, you never can be 100% sure that site will be the winner, or that it will be the winner even if it gives no investment incentives. Corporations make up competing sites even when there aren't any (a site location consultant tells me he always recommends that; see Competing for Capital). They exploit their information advantage well. As a result, governments give them investment attraction subsidies and the average taxpayer pays for it.
How do we know that Foxconn is coming to the United States because it is worried about protectionism? Because it made no economic sense for Foxconn to build here otherwise. There are good reasons Foxconn makes all iPhones in China: land, labor, and just about everything else are way less expensive than in the United States, *and* provincial and municipal governments will give them generous location incentives to favor one over the other. You can't beat that with a stick. But you can beat it if market access is in question.
As long as U.S. protectionism remains ascendant, a growing number of foreign companies will follow Foxconn and hedge their bets to guarantee access to the U.S. market. Due to fiscal federalism, however, the potential advantages from foreign investment (which may not be that great, depending on job losses at existing competitors' facilities) will be diluted or even overwhelmed by the amount of subsidies the newcomers receive. State and local governments need to resist temptation -- to be more precise, we need to find a way politically to make them resist temptation.
H/t to Greg LeRoy for suggesting this article.
Cross-posted at Angry Bear.
Thursday, July 20, 2017
Foxconn aims to break the bank
While the head of the illegitimate Trump regime makes multiple headlines telling the New York Times that he is above the law, we have to remember that there are plenty of other issues of concern to the middle class. One of the most striking is the latest huge bidding war for a gigantic Foxconn manufacturing plant (h/t David Haynes), slated to employ a massive 10,000 workers.
The linked article interviews an American consultant based in Beijing, Einar Tangen, who says that Foxconn's standard procedure is to get as much incentives out of state and local governments as possible; indeed, he says, "You can expect Foxconn to get as close to zero cost as they can. They can do it because they bring so many jobs." Yes -- and no.
Yes, 10,000 jobs is a lot of jobs for a single U.S. investment project. But Foxconn has strong motivations to invest in the United States, most importantly the fear of protectionist trade policies that will keep their iPhones and other electronics out of the country. This mirrors the mid-1980s, when exactly the same fear spurred most Japanese automakers to build at least one assembly plant in the United States. If the company has to have a presence in the U.S. market, especially as competitors were doing during the 1980s, the firm does not actually have that strong a bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States.
The problem, just as in the 1980s, is that as long as individual states do not coordinate their bidding (as happens in the European Union), the dynamic of bidding wars will induce them to offer outrageously high location subsidies, sometimes even in excess of 100% of the cost of the investment. Individual states do not take into effect what happens in other states when they do their cost-benefit analyses of economic development projects. The fact that the new investment will directly or indirectly destroy jobs at competing facilities is of no concern to policymakers in, say, Wisconsin, who will not adjust their cost-per-job estimates to reflect this dynamic.
While the United States has a strong bargaining position, individual states bidding against each other do not have a strong bargaining position. Foxconn believes it *has* to come to the United States, but it does not have to locate its new manufacturing plant in Wisconsin. Nor does it have to put it in Michigan, another state apparently in the hunt for this factory. But we can see that there will be a bidding war with at least two states pursuing the facility, and it will drive up the cost of location subsidies spectacularly. Perhaps we'll see a new all-time record.
Oddly enough, even the states have a factor increasing their bargaining power, a low unemployment rate. In May 2017, Wisconsin's unemployment was down to 3.1%, while Michigan's was 4.2%. For Michigan, this represents a decline of 10.7 percentage points (14.9% to 4.2%) since the peak in July 2009. All other things equal, both states should be less desperate to get these jobs than they would have been in 2009.
Call me cynical, but I'll believe it when I see it for the states to refrain from a bidding war.
The linked article interviews an American consultant based in Beijing, Einar Tangen, who says that Foxconn's standard procedure is to get as much incentives out of state and local governments as possible; indeed, he says, "You can expect Foxconn to get as close to zero cost as they can. They can do it because they bring so many jobs." Yes -- and no.
Yes, 10,000 jobs is a lot of jobs for a single U.S. investment project. But Foxconn has strong motivations to invest in the United States, most importantly the fear of protectionist trade policies that will keep their iPhones and other electronics out of the country. This mirrors the mid-1980s, when exactly the same fear spurred most Japanese automakers to build at least one assembly plant in the United States. If the company has to have a presence in the U.S. market, especially as competitors were doing during the 1980s, the firm does not actually have that strong a bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States.
The problem, just as in the 1980s, is that as long as individual states do not coordinate their bidding (as happens in the European Union), the dynamic of bidding wars will induce them to offer outrageously high location subsidies, sometimes even in excess of 100% of the cost of the investment. Individual states do not take into effect what happens in other states when they do their cost-benefit analyses of economic development projects. The fact that the new investment will directly or indirectly destroy jobs at competing facilities is of no concern to policymakers in, say, Wisconsin, who will not adjust their cost-per-job estimates to reflect this dynamic.
While the United States has a strong bargaining position, individual states bidding against each other do not have a strong bargaining position. Foxconn believes it *has* to come to the United States, but it does not have to locate its new manufacturing plant in Wisconsin. Nor does it have to put it in Michigan, another state apparently in the hunt for this factory. But we can see that there will be a bidding war with at least two states pursuing the facility, and it will drive up the cost of location subsidies spectacularly. Perhaps we'll see a new all-time record.
Oddly enough, even the states have a factor increasing their bargaining power, a low unemployment rate. In May 2017, Wisconsin's unemployment was down to 3.1%, while Michigan's was 4.2%. For Michigan, this represents a decline of 10.7 percentage points (14.9% to 4.2%) since the peak in July 2009. All other things equal, both states should be less desperate to get these jobs than they would have been in 2009.
Call me cynical, but I'll believe it when I see it for the states to refrain from a bidding war.
Friday, July 29, 2011
Wisconsin Subsidies Could Hire 12,000+ State Workers
As we reach the home stretch of the August 9 Wisconsin Senatorial recall elections, it's good to keep in mind just how much businesses there receive in subsidies from the state. To my knowledge, no one has ever made an estimate of total business support there, and so Wisconsin was not used in constructing my national estimate of $70 billion per year in subsidies by state and local governments nationwide.
In light of the upcoming election, I made a special calculation of subsidies in Wisconsin based primarily on the 2011 Summary of Tax Exemption Devices plus the five programs tracked by Good Jobs First in its report “Show Us the Subsidies” This will give us some insight into the potential impact of business subsidies on state employment. As we will see, I estimate the giveaways could be redirected to create over 12,000 middle-class public jobs.
The tax exemption report gave helpful descriptions of the provisions, but certainly I would be able to do a more thorough job in identifying programs with the help of in-state budget experts. So, here I present a conservative estimate of the subsidies to business in Wisconsin.
What I count: I try to make my estimates internationally comparable, so my goal is to identify programs and tax provisions that would be considered a subsidy elsewhere in the world. In particular, I look for provisions that are specific to an industry, a region, a type of business (i.e., small and medium enterprise), or specific goals like R&D, job creation, or pollution control. European Union state aid rules are my model here.
I include, then, most of the state's corporate income and franchise tax exemptions (omitting a few smaller ones to save time), with the important exception of Net Operating Loss provisions, which apply to every corporation and hence are not specific. Wisconsin has a recycling surcharge, which has subsidies for small firms (exempt below $4 million in gross receipts) and for large ones (a cap of $9800 regardless of corporate income).
Sales tax exemptions are the most difficult to judge. When I first made a national subsidy estimate in my 2000 book, Competing for Capital, I counted a large number of these tax breaks as subsidies. I am now persuaded that many sales tax provisions are simply designed to prevent what's known as tax cascading: if businesses had to pay sales tax on all their raw materials and intermediate goods and services, the final consumer would be paying some multiple of the statutory sales tax when purchasing a final good. So now I only count sales tax breaks on machinery and equipment, which are designed to attract investment (pretty much every state does this, and it comes to a lot of money); and industry-specific sales tax exemptions. Thus, if legal services to businesses were exempt from sales tax, I would not consider that to be a subsidy; but, if legal services were only exempt for the banking industry, that would be a subsidy to banking and I would count it. Again, specificity is a key consideration.
Wisconsin presents one other conundrum with sales tax: personal property and supplies used in farming are exempt from the tax. Normally, I'd say that just prevents tax cascading, but if I read the 2009 Summary of Tax Exemption Devices (p. 58) correctly, this provision only dates back to 2007, which may argue for considering it industry-specific – or may argue that a similar provision for manufacturing is no longer a subsidy. I present the estimate both with and without this provision below.
Finally, Good Jobs First tracks five discretionary economic development subsidies, and I include that $37.8 million as well.
Subsidies in Wisconsin
Corporate income tax subsidies $128.1 million
Recycling surcharge tax subsidies $ 38.4 million
Discretionary econ development $ 37.8 million
Sales tax exemptions excluding
personal property used in farming $398.6 million
Total with personal property/farming $602.9 million
Personal property/farming $187.6 million
Total with personal property to farmers $790.5 million
Even excluding the iffy final category in the table, we're looking at over $600 million in subsidies to business per year, enough to hire 12,000 state employees making $50,000 annually in salary and benefits. While it is certainly possible that some of the support to business should be maintained, the large number of public jobs it is costing Wisconsin strongly argues for explicitly weighing which is the better use of the state's money.
Instead, as we know, the Walker administration pushed even more tax breaks through the legislature earlier this year, further exacerbating the state fiscal crisis. This highlights the importance of the August 9 recall elections, as well as the probable recall of Walker himself next year.
(I'd be interested in your feedback on the procedure I used to make this estimate, as well as the political issues involved. If you would like a copy of the full calculation, please contact me.)
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)