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Showing posts with label job piracy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label job piracy. Show all posts

Friday, April 17, 2020

Comparative Responses to the Economic Aspects of the Crisis Show Many Drawbacks in USA


The global COVID-19 pandemic has created an associated economic crisis as many businesses have been forced to close because of lack of demand (travel, for example) or social distancing (too many to list). With predictions of a possible 32% unemployment rate in the United States, how does the response to the economic crisis here compare with those of other countries?

Both the United States and our major European allies have passed economic stimulus laws that exceed 10% of gross domestic product. The $2.2 trillion CARES Act package signed March 27 was 10.1% of 2019 GDP of $21.7 trillion. Spain passed an even larger package, equaling 20% of its GDP.

We can think of the CARES Act as having three main components. First, there are individual safety-net supports, including the $1,200 payments most individual adults will received, more money into the SNAP (formerly named Food Stamp) program, and greatly expanded unemployment insurance. Second, there are $350 billion in forgivable loans for small business, which become grants if the companies don’t lay off their employees (the “Paycheck Protection Plan”). Third, there is a $500 billion bailout fund for large companies. This is poorly designed, most importantly because it doesn’t require companies to maintain staff. Over 20 million people have filed for unemployment benefits in the last four weeks alone.

Besides the catastrophic loss of wages, the biggest problem with allowing bailed-out companies to lay off staff is that such a large percentage of the U.S. workforce gets its health insurance through work, meaning that when they lose their jobs, they also lose their health insurance. As Saez and Zucman point out, people can continue their employer’s insurance under COBRA, but it is extremely expensive since there is no employer contribution. This comes precisely at a time when they may really need it, given the length and ruinous expense of treatment incurred for people with severe cases of COVID-19.

By contrast, in all western European countries (as well as Canada, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, etc.) health insurance is universal. Even in a country with a public/private system like Germany, when you lose your insurance due to job loss, you transition seamlessly to a public health insurance plan with no loss of coverage.

European responses have focused much more on a wage-support approach like the small business program in the United States, except applied economy-wide. The U.K. government has been described as the “payer of last resort,” as it stands to guarantee 80% of workers’ wages indefinitely. For both employees and the self-employed, this would be capped at £ 2,500 (approximately $3,125) per month. Given that the United Kingdom has the National Health Service, a true socialized medicine system completely divorced from employment status, layoffs were never going to mean a loss of health care access for workers in Great Britain and Northern Ireland. But by guaranteeing employment, the United Kingdom will have higher levels of job security than U.S. workers will, with jobs to go back to when the crisis ends. Indeed, the problem in the United States is not simply health insurance, but the fact that each of the 50 states has different rules for unemployment insurance, with inter-state variation both in the generosity and length of payments in the different programs.

An important difference between wage support in Europe and for small business in the United States is that the European plans are open-ended, whereas the U.S. plan must be renewed with Congressional legislation every time it runs out of money. This opens the possibility of deadlocks if attempts are made to attach unrelated provisions to an extension bill, something that happens frequently in Congress. And this is no longer a prediction, because the $350 billion ran out on April 16.

Absent federal leadership, we also expect “the economic war among the states” to resume, with each state offering subsidies trying to attract investment, in some cases through job piracy. From our experience during the Great Recession (when there were far more desperate politicians chasing far fewer deals), we can expect to see another surge in expensive megadeals.

Facing high unemployment and relatively few opportunities to attract large numbers of jobs, states will bid more for those opportunities than they would in more prosperous times. States will be tempted to engage in job piracy in many multi-state metropolitan areas, such as New York, Charlotte, and Memphis.

We need to remind states about the first-ever binding anti-piracy agreement, the 2019 accord between Kansas and Missouri, where research by the Hall Family Foundation had documented that the two states wasted $335 million over 10 years moving companies short distances but across the state line within Greater Kansas City.

It is imperative that we support the anti-piracy legislation pending in 13 states this year, sponsored by Chicago-based Progressive Public Affairs, which has amassed lead sponsors from both parties (nine states have Democratic sponsors, while four have Republican sponsors). And we will need to keep the pressure on states to ensure that companies which receive government support fulfill their job and other commitments.

Given the predominance of wage support in European countries, most of this funding will not be subject to EU subsidy (“state aid”) rules. That’s because the money will be available economy-wide in the Member States, not favoring one company over another. In technical terms, this use of the funds is “non-selective,” and therefore not state aid at all, as our contacts at the European Commission have explained. Nevertheless, due to the large amounts of money at stake, each Member State will be responsible to ensure that recipients maintain employment in order to qualify for government paying their wage bills.

Some EU spending will qualify as state aid, such as the Danish’s government’s plan to partially compensate organizers of conferences and other events that were canceled due to the coronavirus pandemic. That is, it is selective, for being available to one industry. To spell out such distinctions, the European Commission published on March 19th its “Temporary Framework” notifying Member States about likely scenarios and whether or not it was likely to approve subsidies the Member States might propose. (Note that the Commission has exclusive power to approve, modify, or deny proposed state aid projects or programs by the 27 Member States, subject to court review.) As I have shown previously, the European Union has shown itself much better than the United States at controlling economic development subsidies.

As we can see, there are major drawbacks to the U.S. response to the economic crisis. By letting people become unemployed rather than making an open-ended wage guarantee, workers lose their health insurance and have no assurance of a job to go back to when the health crisis ends. High unemployment will also pressure state and local governments to return to worst practices in economic development. There is still time to change course, but it will take constant and high levels of political pressure to make it happen.

Cross-posted with Good Jobs First.

Friday, August 2, 2019

First-ever binding end to a border war: Missouri-Kansas UPDATED

Kansas Governor Laura Kelly has just signed an executive order that prohibits state subsidies being used to move existing Missouri firms in four Missouri counties to three Kansas counties, which together make up the Kansas City metropolitan area. Unlike previous voluntary no-raiding deals, such as NY-NJ-CT, Council of Great Lakes Governors, and even Australia's Interstate Investment Cooperation Agreement, this is not a voluntary agreement, but one with the force of law, a first in the country's history.

The binding nature of the agreement comes from the fact that both states have legally bound themselves. In June (h/t New York Times), the Missouri legislature passed and the Governor signed into law restrictions on using state subsidy funds (such as Missouri Works) from being used to attract companies operating in three counties in Kansas in the Kansas City metro area. The law stipulated, however, that this would not go into effect unless Kansas passed similar binding regulations on its state subsidies (Promoting Employment Across Kansas, or PEAK) being used to attract firms on the Missouri side of the metro area. Today's action by Kansas' Kelly meets the stipulations of the Missouri law.

Kansas and Missouri have thus joined the European Union as the only areas with legally binding no-raiding rules, anywhere in the world. Of course, the EU's provisions, based in the Guidelines for Regional Aid, cover the entire territory, whereas the Kansas-Missouri ban only applies in the Kansas City metropolitan area. However, since that's where almost all the job piracy between the two states takes place, the two states' action is truly historic.

The two states made a previous attempt at a binding agreement in 2014-16: Missouri passed a similar law to this year's in 2014, but Kansas' last-minute law just before a 2016 deadline in the Missouri law precipitated a stalemate, and no new deal was made until this year.

It should be remembered that an agreement of this type has been advocated for by a number of companies in the region, notably Hallmark and the Hall Family Foundation. Their work uncovered the hundreds of millions of dollars that had gone into the border war and led to pressure being put on both state governments to end the madness.

Friday, April 28, 2017

European Union ends relocation subsidies

This isn't actually news, but it's news to me, and it's something you need to know. Greg LeRoy sent me an article by James Meek in London Review of Books (20 April 2017) that he'd been sent by a friend, documenting more EU-permitted job piracy by Poland that preceded the case I discuss at length in my book, Investment Incentives and the Global Competition for Capital. There, I criticized the European Commission's Directorate-General for Competition for approving a 54.5 million euro subsidy for Dell to move from Ireland to Poland in 2009. During my January 2011 book tour, I took a lot of flak from DG Competition when I presented there, with several staff pushing back on my criticism of this decision.

As the LRB article pointed out, there was another case involving Poland, where Cadbury received state aid of about $5 million (14.18 million zloty when the zloty was worth about 0.35 USD) in November 2008 to move from the Somerdale, United Kingdom, to Skarbimierz (the LRB gives a much bigger number, but from unspecified "Polish government figures," so I cannot find a way to compare it with the EU's case report). This case is only listed in the EU's Official Journal, where it is reported as having been notified under the General Block Exemption Regulation. As this regulation is intended for uncontroversial cases, that makes it evidence, though hardly proof, for a relatively smaller rather than larger aid amount. For my purposes, the amount is less important than the fact that we have another documented relocation subsidy.

What's the big "news"? In Meek's article we read, "In 2014, too late for Somerdale, the EU recognised its error and banned the use of national subsidies to entice multinationals to move production from one EU country to another." Just like that.*

Okay, I'm abstracting from the political process. But it's pretty clear what happened. As I reported in Investment Incentives and the Global Competition for Capital, when Dell moved to Poland, all of Ireland was up in arms, including government officials and Members of the European Parliament. The European Parliament made its displeasure known. What the Somerdale case shows us is that there was at least one other country on the wrong end of a relocation subsidy, strengthening further the political pressure for state aid reform.

As I said, Commission staff believed they made the correct decision in the subsequent Dell case, and the rationale would have been exactly the same for Cadbury. The move sent economic activity from somewhere with high per capita income to a place with a far lower per capita income. They saw this as an overall increase of efficiency within the European Union. As I argued, though, even if that were the case, the decision wasn't good for intra-EU solidarity, and it undermined support for policies promoting the growth of the EU's poorer regions ("cohesion" policy in EU-speak). In light of the 2014 policy change, we know that arguments aligned to mine were the ones that carried the day politically.

This shouldn't come as any surprise: People generally don't like job piracy when they know about it. If you've read Chapter 5 of my book Competing for Capital, you know that it's basically not allowed for states to use federal funds (Community Development Block Grants, Small Business Administration, etc.) to engage in job piracy. But in each program's case, the reform happened only after one or more such incidents (many of them reported to me by Greg LeRoy during my research) had taken place, leading to demands for change.

Moreover, individual states know how to prevent job piracy within their own state. As of 2013, 40 states had shown their ability to write anti-piracy rules (p. iii). But they don't hesitate to use relocation subsidies when it comes to raiding other states. They can't seem to help themselves since they all need investment, and nothing stops other states from providing incentives. In fact, all multi-state anti-piracy agreement in the U.S. have failed, and even the most promising recent attempt (Kansas/Missouri) failed to get off the ground.

Only the federal government can stop states from stealing jobs from one another, but don't hold your breath on it happening anytime soon even though the negative-sum nature of inter-state border wars is easy to see. It's heartening to me to see the European Union has finally changed its policy, given that I have written mostly positive things about state aid control over the years. It's great for the glaring exception to be gone.


*For the technically inclined, this is embodied in a ban of relocation subsidies under the General Block Exemption Regulation, and in the Guidelines for Regional Aid 2014-2020, which classifies a relocation aid (paragraph 122) as "a manifest negative effect," "where the negative effects of the aid manifestly outweigh any positive effects, so that the aid cannot be declared compatible with the internal market" (paragraph 118).

Cross-posted at Angry Bear.

Sunday, May 8, 2016

Kansas City event analyzes the border war

As I noted last time, there is finally a real possibility that the $200+ million job piracy border war between Kansas and Missouri could have a real, legally binding truce. As we wait to find out if this materializes, American Public Square in Kansas City is sponsoring a public forum Wednesday, May 11, at the Plaza Branch of the Kansas City Public Library at 6:00pm.

"Cents and Sensibility" will examine the pluses and minuses of economic development subsidies, turning to research on the effects and effectiveness of these incentives, whether it can be justified to give subsidies to private enterprises, and who benefits from subsidy programs.

I will be taking part in this event, which has an interesting format: no presentations, just questions from the get-go, and a roving reporter who acts as a real-time fact checker. The other panel participants are:

Bill Hall, President, Hall Family Foundation
Michael Farren, Research Fellow, Mercatus Center, George Mason University
Moderator: Dr. Scott Helm, Director of the MPA program at UM-Kansas City's Henry W. Bloch School of Management
Roving Reporter: Steven Steigman, Chief of Broadcast Operations, KCUR 89.3

Be there or be square!

Monday, April 18, 2016

Breakthrough in Kansas-Missouri Border War

Via @goodjobsfirst, we learned Friday that Kansas Governor Sam Brownback had made a major response to Missouri's proposed jobs truce in the Kansas City region.

As regular readers may recall, studies have shown that more than $200 million has been spent moving jobs back and forth across the state border in the Missouri and Kansas counties surrounding Kansas City. This is to create 0 new jobs. Despite this being perhaps the country's second-largest border war after the New York City area, Governors Jay Nixon (D-Missouri) and Brownback (R-Kansas) in December 2012 both told New York Times reporter Louise Story, on camera, that they had no plans to end the incessant job piracy.

Nevertheless, in July 2014, Nixon did an about-face, signing a bill from the majority-Republican legislature to end the availability of state subsidies to be used for such job poaching. Unlike the voluntary no-raiding agreements I have discussed on previous occasions (Council of Great Lakes Governors, NY-NJ-CT, Kansas-Missouri, and even Australia's Interstate Investment Cooperation Agreement), this has the force of law. The four counties making up Kansas City would be completely barred from using state subsidies to give relocation subsidies to companies in four bordering Kansas counties, if Kansas passes comparable rules.

Now, facing an August 2016 deadline in the Missouri law for the truce to take effect, Brownback ordered the Kansas Department of Commerce to disapprove PEAK (Promoting Employment Across Kansas) subsidies for job piracy, and asking for legislation to formalize this policy.

Brownback's proposal differed from the Missouri law by allowing PEAK subsidies (and the corresponding Missouri Works program) to be used for piracy if a company invested at least $10 million in new construction. While this means really large projects would not be affected by the truce, it would kill off the dozens of deals made by what Brownback called "lease jumpers," who simply move from a leased facility in one state to a leased facility in the other to cash in on the subsidy programs.

Good Jobs First today lauded the progress on the truce, noting the five years of both public and behind-the-scenes work by Hallmark and 16 other prominent Kansas City companies to promote sanity. Good Jobs First, of course, has conducted a great deal of research on job piracy, including the 2013 report, The Job-Creation Shell Game. Executive Director Greg LeRoy expressed hope that this potential agreement would be "a wake-up call" for the National Governors Association, which he called "MIA" on the issue of job piracy since 1993.

This is not yet a done deal. However, the proposal to meet legislation with legislation would create an unprecedented advance in stopping job piracy.

Friday, June 5, 2015

GE threatens to leave Connecticut UPDATED

A non-blogging friend has brought to my attention the fact that General Electric is threatening to move its corporate headquarters out of Connecticut in response to proposed tax increases in the state budget. The company, based in Fairfield, objects to increases in the taxes for data processing and corporate headquarters. Insurance companies Aetna and Travelers have also issued similar threats.

In GE's case in particular, this is pretty rich. The New York Times reports that GE made $14.2 billion in 2010 and received a federal tax refund of $3 billion. It is a company that touts bringing manufacturing jobs back from China but conveniently omits mentioning that the new jobs, in Louisville, pay $13/hour rather than the $22/hour they paid before they left for China. A model of corporate virtue it ain't, yet President Obama sees fit to lean on chief executive officer Jeffrey Immelt as one of his top business advisers.

Regular readers no doubt recall that every time a threat like this is made, vultures start to swoop in to attract the potential relocator to their state with a long list of goodies. So it should come as no surprise that a mere three days after GE first floated this idea, Tampa, Florida, has put GE in in its sights. We've seen this story many times before: Boeing and Sears immediately spring to mind. As always, the possibility of receiving relocation subsidies makes relocation less expensive and makes it more likely that a company's current home will have to give concessions to make it stay. Job piracy and job blackmail are intimately related.

As my friend points out, it's not surprising that Connecticut is running a big budget deficit. In just the past few years, according to the Good Jobs First Megadeals database (March 2015 spreadsheet update), the state gave $313.75 million to Schupp & Grochmal (2007), $89.5 million to Starwood Hotels (2009), $291 million to Jackson Laboratory (2011), $115 million to Bridgewater Associates (2012), and a whopping $400 million to United Technologies (2014). This last deal is fully 20% of the entire 2-year budget deficit facing the state, $2 billion.

A showdown is looming in this newest case of raw corporate power. Yesterday, the Connecticut legislature passed the budget, though leaders signaled a willingness to consider small changes when it comes back for a special session. The same day, however, Immelt emailed employees to let them know a task force had been set up to look into relocation.

Stay tuned!

Update: More evidence that GE is a whiny, hyper-aggressive tax avoider:  http://www.courant.com/opinion/op-ed/hc-op-cibes-ct-business-taxes-not-high-0609-20150608-story.html

Tuesday, October 28, 2014

How to deal with the growing incentives competition

This article was originally published in the Columbia FDI Perspectives series of the Columbia Center for Sustainable Investment, #131, September 29. I have left it largely unchanged, except for adding a link and a comment, and correcting a grammatical error.



As I discussed in an earlier Perspective,[1] the use of investment incentives is pervasive and growing. The most recent example [this was completed prior to the Tesla auction] of a big bidding war was when Boeing threatened to move production of its 777-X aircraft out of Washington state, prompting some 20 states to offer incentive packages to the company (including $1.7 billion from Missouri). In the end, Washington gave Boeing a package of tax incentives worth a record-breaking $8.7 billion over the 2025 – 2040 period to stay, and the unions made substantial concessions regarding pensions.

What can be done to control such auctions, which are often international in scope? The most robust control method, regional in scope, is embodied in the European Union (EU) Guidelines on Regional Aid. These rules guarantee transparency, set variable limits (in terms of “aid intensity,” which equals subsidy/investment) for aid levels based on each region’s per capita income, and reduce the value of aid to large investment projects over €50 million. They require projects to stay at least five years and mandate the use of clawbacks for firms that fail to meet their commitments in investment contracts. Moreover, the guidelines provide demerits for firms in a dominant position in their industry, although they do not mandate a particular reduction in aid.

The other international control measure comes under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. While these rules are more tailored to production subsidies than to investment incentives, the latter certainly come under the purview of the Agreement as well, as illustrated by the EU’s successful complaint against subsidies for Boeing in the states of Washington, Illinois and Kansas.

However, this case also illustrates the limits of WTO subsidy control. The EU has already filed a compliance complaint,[2] and there is little likelihood the United States (US) will comply anytime soon (the US Trade Representative’s office claims that the US has complied, but as long as the state and local tax credits continue in Washington state, that is not correct). Indeed, as mentioned, Washington state has approved a new round of subsidies for Boeing that is likely to initiate a new WTO dispute. 

While the WTO rules require frequent notification of subsidies, there is no penalty for failure to notify, with the result that subsidy notifications are of very uneven quality. Federal states outside the EU frequently make poor quality notifications regarding subnational subsidies. Finally, the TRIMs and GATS agreements regulate performance requirements, but not investment incentives.

What, then, can be done against incentives competition? First, there must be continuing efforts to improve the transparency of location subsidies. This is necessary for jurisdictions to make effective investment promotion policy (especially in a region such as the European Union and the United States, where there are many competing governments) as well as for international policy discussion.

Second, the EU’s example shows that incorporating subsidies rules into regional agreements can be a fruitful way to bring bidding wars under control. For many products, such as automobile assembly and steel, corporate location decisions still focus on a single region, meaning that such rules would be geographically comprehensive enough for a variety of industries. Consequently, major stakeholders—including the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, the International Institute for Sustainable Development, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development—should unite in promoting location subsidy guidelines within regional trade areas. There are no doubt numerous other non-governmental organizations that would endorse such a move.

Third, WTO notifications should be strengthened. Incomplete notifications should be flagged and countries involved should be pressured to give cost estimates for subsidies at all levels of government. Still, it is difficult to envision that sanctions for non-compliance will be introduced.

Fourth, no-raiding zones could be a first step for countries to negotiate controls over investment subsidies. A no-raiding agreement simply commits a state to not give a subsidy to relocate an existing facility from another state; it would not apply to new investments. Their track record is mixed—several agreements among US states failed quickly, but Australia (2003-2011) and Canada (1994-present) have been more successful.[3] Despite these mixed results, it is easier to demonstrate to policymakers the futility of relocation subsidies, since they create no new jobs, than it is to do for incentives for new investment, which could make this a more feasible first step.

Though national and subnational jurisdictions have incentives to offer location subsidies, these proposed measures would help keep their value to more reasonable levels with a lower likelihood of distorting competition and international investment flows.



[1] Kenneth P. Thomas, “Investment incentives and the global competition for capital,” Columbia FDI Perspectives, No. 54, December 30, 2011.
[2] Emelie Rutherford, “EU wants $12 billion in U.S. sanctions over Boeing subsidy spat,” Defense Daily, September 27, 2012.
[3] Kenneth P. Thomas,  “Regulating investment attraction: Canada’s Code of Conduct on Incentives in a comparative context,” 37 Canadian Public Policy, 3 (2011), pp. 343-357; Kenneth P. Thomas, “EU control of state aid to mobile investment in comparative perspective,” 34 Journal of European Integration 6 (2012), pp. 567-584.



 From: Kenneth P. Thomas, "How to deal with the growing incentives competition," Columbia FDI Perspectives, No. 131, September 29, 2014. Reprinted with permission from the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (ccsi.columbia.edu).
 
Cross-posted at Angry Bear.