This past week I received my chapter author's copy of a new book from Columbia University Press, Rethinking Investment Incentives: Trends and Policy Options. Based initially on the November 2013 conference on investment incentives at Columbia Law School, the contributors were put through their paces to upgrade their conference presentations into proper papers. The result is what Theodore Moran of Georgetown University calls in the Foreword "a who's-who of experts across this broad span of topics." He predicts, and I concur, that the work presented in this book will help drive policy discussions around the globe.
The book is divided into four parts. The first discusses theoretical debates on definitions and the effect of these incentives on (especially) foreign direct investment. The second section provides a global overview of the use of incentive incentives, both in major economies and in developing countries. Part III includes practical tools for ensuring program effectiveness as well as value for money. This includes a chapter on cost-benefit analysis, a methodology of which I am highly skeptical. As I have written before, if you end this analysis at the state (or city!) border, you miss many of the indirect job losses inflicted at competing companies by the addition of new subsidized competition. Indeed, according to economist Tim Bartik, very few subsidy programs have positive *national* effects, even if they have positive local effects that will be the only thing considered in the cost-benefit analysis.
Finally, the fourth part of the book considers ways to reduce the competitive use of investment incentives to attract investment. My chapter falls in this section, considering the control of subnational incentives in Australia, Canada, and the United States. (Spoiler: Most of the record is not pretty; Australia was an exception but the policy expired in 2011.) A variety of supranational regulatory efforts, including most notably that of the European Union, are considered in a chapter by Lise Johnson.
Have I teased you enough yet? This book is a must-have if you are interested in investment incentives and economic development; co-editors Ana Teresa Tavares-Lehmann (University of Porto, Portugal), Perrine Toledano, Lise Johnson, and Lisa Sachs (all of the Columbia Center for Sustainable Investment) are to be congratulated for the fine product.
Showing posts with label Australia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Australia. Show all posts
Wednesday, June 29, 2016
Friday, February 13, 2015
Third Way trade agreements study leaves out a lot
Third Way (h/t TPM), a Democratic pro-trade think tank, has released a new study, "Are Modern Trade Deals Working?" It examines the various "free trade" deals the U.S. has signed since 2000 to conclude that 13 of 17 have led to an improvement in our goods (not including services; see more below) trade balance with the countries involved, giving a net improvement over the 17 agreements studied of $30.2 billion per year.
Long-time readers of this blog may remember that I did a similar analysis (though in less detail than the Third Way study) in 2012. Unlike the Third Way report, my post included all U.S. free trade agreements (rather than starting in 2001 like Third Way) as well as the effect of the 2000 agreement for Permanent Normalized Trade Relations (PNTR) with China. So, compared to the Third Way study, my post includes the FTAs with Israel, Canada, and Mexico, but did not consider the Panama FTA, which had not yet come into effect when I posted. My conclusion was essentially the same as Third Way's, that the effects of the agreements on our trade in goods were usually positive, but of small size (the effect of the Israel FTA was also small). Because the Third Way study begins in 2001, however, it omits the impacts of NAFTA and PNTR with China. However, as my post showed, they are the most important by far.
This fact is not lost on opponents of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Lori Wallach of Public Citizen Global Trade Watch told the Associated Press that "studies such as Third Way's make a big deal out of modest trade improvements with countries like Panama, and gloss over huge trade deficits with major trading partners such as South Korea, Mexico and Canada." She's right.
In 1993, the year before NAFTA went into effect, the United States had a surplus with Mexico on trade in goods of $1.7 billion. In 1995, it went to a deficit of $15.8 billion, and in 2014 the goods trade deficit was $53.8 billion, down from 2007's peak of $74.8 billion. This was in sharp contrast with the analysis of Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott, who predicted trade surpluses on the order of $9-12 billion through the 2000s, even as they admitted that the peso was overvalued (it collapsed in value in the December 1994 "Tequila crisis").
Meanwhile, the balance of trade in goods with Canada went from a deficit of $10.8 billion in 1993 to $34.0 billion in 2014. Note that the U.S. had a peak deficit of $78.3 billion in 2008, which collapsed to $21.6 billion in 2009.
In 2000, the year PNTR was adopted, the United States had an $83.9 billion goods trade deficit with China. In May of that year, the International Trade Commission (h/t David Cay Johnston) released a report estimating that the trade balance would worsen by a further $4.3 billion. According to the article, the U.S. Trade Representative and the White House both criticized this study strongly. And in fact, the 2001 deficit fell to $83.1 billion. However, in 2002 it was $103.1 billion, an increase more than four times the ITC prediction, and by 2014 it had grown to $342.6 billion.
By including trade in goods but not trade in services, Third Way is admirably the stacking the deck against its own position. It points out that the U.S. has a global surplus in trade in services of $232 billion in 2014, including a $45 billion surplus with Canada and Mexico. However, it doesn't mention that the U.S. goods trade deficit was $737 billion in 2014, or that the country's overall 2014 trade deficit was $505 billion, up from $477 billion in 2013.
The ultimate question is whether TPP and TTIP are going to be more like the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, or more like NAFTA and PNTR. Considering that the TPP includes all the NAFTA countries, Australia, Chile, Japan, and six others, comprising "nearly 40 percent of global GDP," I think it's safe to assume that it will have a much bigger impact than the FTAs with Australia or Chile, for instance. Similarly, since the European Union has an economy about the same size as the U.S. economy, I believe the TTIP will also have big consequences.
Moreover, we have to remember that these are much more than trade agreements. Both of them have increased protections for investors, patents, trademarks, and other intellectual property, and in both of them the U.S. is advocating the inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement so companies can sue governments through arbitration rather than courts, something that has proven more favorable for companies vis-a-vis both governments and consumers. So, in addition to the negative effects on U.S. workers that we would expect on the basis of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, all signatory countries are likely to suffer from higher prices for medicine and assaults on their regulations through investor-state dispute settlement.
Thus, while the Third Way study is right as far as it goes, what it leaves out is far more significant and worrisome.
Long-time readers of this blog may remember that I did a similar analysis (though in less detail than the Third Way study) in 2012. Unlike the Third Way report, my post included all U.S. free trade agreements (rather than starting in 2001 like Third Way) as well as the effect of the 2000 agreement for Permanent Normalized Trade Relations (PNTR) with China. So, compared to the Third Way study, my post includes the FTAs with Israel, Canada, and Mexico, but did not consider the Panama FTA, which had not yet come into effect when I posted. My conclusion was essentially the same as Third Way's, that the effects of the agreements on our trade in goods were usually positive, but of small size (the effect of the Israel FTA was also small). Because the Third Way study begins in 2001, however, it omits the impacts of NAFTA and PNTR with China. However, as my post showed, they are the most important by far.
This fact is not lost on opponents of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Lori Wallach of Public Citizen Global Trade Watch told the Associated Press that "studies such as Third Way's make a big deal out of modest trade improvements with countries like Panama, and gloss over huge trade deficits with major trading partners such as South Korea, Mexico and Canada." She's right.
In 1993, the year before NAFTA went into effect, the United States had a surplus with Mexico on trade in goods of $1.7 billion. In 1995, it went to a deficit of $15.8 billion, and in 2014 the goods trade deficit was $53.8 billion, down from 2007's peak of $74.8 billion. This was in sharp contrast with the analysis of Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott, who predicted trade surpluses on the order of $9-12 billion through the 2000s, even as they admitted that the peso was overvalued (it collapsed in value in the December 1994 "Tequila crisis").
Meanwhile, the balance of trade in goods with Canada went from a deficit of $10.8 billion in 1993 to $34.0 billion in 2014. Note that the U.S. had a peak deficit of $78.3 billion in 2008, which collapsed to $21.6 billion in 2009.
In 2000, the year PNTR was adopted, the United States had an $83.9 billion goods trade deficit with China. In May of that year, the International Trade Commission (h/t David Cay Johnston) released a report estimating that the trade balance would worsen by a further $4.3 billion. According to the article, the U.S. Trade Representative and the White House both criticized this study strongly. And in fact, the 2001 deficit fell to $83.1 billion. However, in 2002 it was $103.1 billion, an increase more than four times the ITC prediction, and by 2014 it had grown to $342.6 billion.
By including trade in goods but not trade in services, Third Way is admirably the stacking the deck against its own position. It points out that the U.S. has a global surplus in trade in services of $232 billion in 2014, including a $45 billion surplus with Canada and Mexico. However, it doesn't mention that the U.S. goods trade deficit was $737 billion in 2014, or that the country's overall 2014 trade deficit was $505 billion, up from $477 billion in 2013.
The ultimate question is whether TPP and TTIP are going to be more like the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, or more like NAFTA and PNTR. Considering that the TPP includes all the NAFTA countries, Australia, Chile, Japan, and six others, comprising "nearly 40 percent of global GDP," I think it's safe to assume that it will have a much bigger impact than the FTAs with Australia or Chile, for instance. Similarly, since the European Union has an economy about the same size as the U.S. economy, I believe the TTIP will also have big consequences.
Moreover, we have to remember that these are much more than trade agreements. Both of them have increased protections for investors, patents, trademarks, and other intellectual property, and in both of them the U.S. is advocating the inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement so companies can sue governments through arbitration rather than courts, something that has proven more favorable for companies vis-a-vis both governments and consumers. So, in addition to the negative effects on U.S. workers that we would expect on the basis of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, all signatory countries are likely to suffer from higher prices for medicine and assaults on their regulations through investor-state dispute settlement.
Thus, while the Third Way study is right as far as it goes, what it leaves out is far more significant and worrisome.
Thursday, July 19, 2012
U.S. Trails at Least 15 OECD Countries in Median Wealth
Via @exiledonline, I learned today (July 18) that Canadians are richer than Americans. This is rather surprising, since GDP per capita is higher in the U.S than in Canada.: $48,100 vs. $40,300 (at purchasing power parity or PPP), according to the CIA World Factbook. But in fact things are much worse than that, as 15 OECD countries (plus Singapore and Taiwan) have higher median wealth than the U.S. does. There may even be more, as the Credit Suisse report I discuss below does not give median wealth data for several countries with higher mean wealth than the U.S.
Most reporting has been based on a story that was run in the June 30th Globe and Mail claiming that average (mean) Canadian household wealth had reached $363,202 vs. just under $320,000 in the U.S. This is not a particularly informative statistic, however, since wealth is even more unevenly distributed than income, and income in the U.S. is already highly unequally distributed. What we really need is median net worth, i.e. the level at the exact middle of the net worth distribution in a country. G&M commenter "TJMone" picks up that point, receiving an answer from "porkbarrel pundit": a Credit Suisse report from October 2011 (via LSM Insurance), shows that the median net worth per adult in Canada was $89,014, compared to just $52,752 in the U.S. (all figures in U.S. dollars).
American reporting based on the study in the G&M did not start until 18 days later, when an article in U.S. News & World Report picked it up (Canadians are right: no one in the U.S. is paying attention to them). Moreover, no one picked up on the much better data in the Credit Suisse report until later in the day, when Dylan Matthews at Wonkblog wrote a great story on it (there are many high-quality comments, too). It turns out that lots of OECD countries, including economic basket cases Italy, Spain, and Ireland, have higher median wealth than we do. See the chart below:
Source: Dylan Matthews, based on data from Credit Suisse
It is mind boggling that median Australian net wealth per adult is four times that of the U.S., and Italy is three times as high. Ireland and Spain, meanwhile, are also higher despite having housing busts similar to that in the United States. What is going on here?
Part of the answer is more equal income distribution. According to the Credit Suisse report, mean wealth per adult is just shy of 5 times median wealth in the U.S., whereas in Canada it's a little less than a 3:1 ratio (see Table 7-1). Other countries with higher median but lower mean net worth per adult are Taiwan, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Spain. Australia has a higher mean net worth than the U.S., but its ratio of mean to median net worth per adult is less than 2:1.
Another part of the answer may be that in many other wealthy countries, households have less debt. If you remember Michael Moore's movie Sicko, in one scene he interviews an upper-middle class French family and asks them what debt they have. Their only significant debt is their mortgage, because they didn't have to take out loans to go to college. The Credit Suisse report finds this pattern (unfortunately, only mean debt, not median debt). Mean debt per adult (see Table 2-4) is $59,362 in 2011 for the United States, whereas for France it is $40,873, Germany $33,424, and Italy only $24,291. Of course, this isn't true of all countries: Ireland and Switzerland both have much higher mean debt per adult, but they also have about twice the median wealth per adult of the U.S.
This analysis is hardly exhaustive; I bet a good book could be written on the subject.
One final point: Matthews skewers the claim by Globe and Mail author Michael Adams (whose firm conducted the study discussed in his article) and later commenters on both sides of the border who accepted Adams' claim that this was a historical first. As he shows with U.S. and Canadian government data, Canada's median household net worth was significantly higher in 2004-5, before the crisis, than here in the U.S. Given the huge disparities between the United States and some of the other countries, it is likely that net worth per adult has been higher in a number of these countries for quite some time. These data reflect trends that have been developing for a long time, and are not purely driven by the economic crisis or by any single set of policies. But they make for sobering reading, and deserve more than the superficial analysis most of the U.S. press has given them so far. Bravo to Matthews for a great piece of analysis.
Cross-posted at Angry Bear.
Most reporting has been based on a story that was run in the June 30th Globe and Mail claiming that average (mean) Canadian household wealth had reached $363,202 vs. just under $320,000 in the U.S. This is not a particularly informative statistic, however, since wealth is even more unevenly distributed than income, and income in the U.S. is already highly unequally distributed. What we really need is median net worth, i.e. the level at the exact middle of the net worth distribution in a country. G&M commenter "TJMone" picks up that point, receiving an answer from "porkbarrel pundit": a Credit Suisse report from October 2011 (via LSM Insurance), shows that the median net worth per adult in Canada was $89,014, compared to just $52,752 in the U.S. (all figures in U.S. dollars).
American reporting based on the study in the G&M did not start until 18 days later, when an article in U.S. News & World Report picked it up (Canadians are right: no one in the U.S. is paying attention to them). Moreover, no one picked up on the much better data in the Credit Suisse report until later in the day, when Dylan Matthews at Wonkblog wrote a great story on it (there are many high-quality comments, too). It turns out that lots of OECD countries, including economic basket cases Italy, Spain, and Ireland, have higher median wealth than we do. See the chart below:
Source: Dylan Matthews, based on data from Credit Suisse
It is mind boggling that median Australian net wealth per adult is four times that of the U.S., and Italy is three times as high. Ireland and Spain, meanwhile, are also higher despite having housing busts similar to that in the United States. What is going on here?
Part of the answer is more equal income distribution. According to the Credit Suisse report, mean wealth per adult is just shy of 5 times median wealth in the U.S., whereas in Canada it's a little less than a 3:1 ratio (see Table 7-1). Other countries with higher median but lower mean net worth per adult are Taiwan, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Spain. Australia has a higher mean net worth than the U.S., but its ratio of mean to median net worth per adult is less than 2:1.
Another part of the answer may be that in many other wealthy countries, households have less debt. If you remember Michael Moore's movie Sicko, in one scene he interviews an upper-middle class French family and asks them what debt they have. Their only significant debt is their mortgage, because they didn't have to take out loans to go to college. The Credit Suisse report finds this pattern (unfortunately, only mean debt, not median debt). Mean debt per adult (see Table 2-4) is $59,362 in 2011 for the United States, whereas for France it is $40,873, Germany $33,424, and Italy only $24,291. Of course, this isn't true of all countries: Ireland and Switzerland both have much higher mean debt per adult, but they also have about twice the median wealth per adult of the U.S.
This analysis is hardly exhaustive; I bet a good book could be written on the subject.
One final point: Matthews skewers the claim by Globe and Mail author Michael Adams (whose firm conducted the study discussed in his article) and later commenters on both sides of the border who accepted Adams' claim that this was a historical first. As he shows with U.S. and Canadian government data, Canada's median household net worth was significantly higher in 2004-5, before the crisis, than here in the U.S. Given the huge disparities between the United States and some of the other countries, it is likely that net worth per adult has been higher in a number of these countries for quite some time. These data reflect trends that have been developing for a long time, and are not purely driven by the economic crisis or by any single set of policies. But they make for sobering reading, and deserve more than the superficial analysis most of the U.S. press has given them so far. Bravo to Matthews for a great piece of analysis.
Cross-posted at Angry Bear.
Sunday, October 2, 2011
Job piracy in Canada, Australia, and the United States
As I mentioned in August, my article "Regulating Investment Attraction: Canada's Code of Conduct in Comparative Perspective," has just appeared in the September issue of the journal Canadian Public Policy.
Job piracy (using subsidies to induce the relocation of an existing facility) is a big problem in the United States. New York City and Kansas City have been subject to repeated raids by neighboring states, and a Good Jobs First study this summer documented extensive job piracy in the Cincinnati and Cleveland metropolitan areas. Two voluntary anti-poaching agreements among groups of states were complete failures.
In the early to mid-1990s, Canada was seeing large-scale job piracy as well. Crown Life Insurance moved 1200 jobs from Toronto to Regina, Saskatchewan, in 1991, receiving a C$250 million loan guarantee to do so. New Brunswick was handing out millions of dollars to call centers to relocate there, including C$11 million to get United Parcel Service to consolidate 870 jobs from three other provinces in Canada. With this background, British Columbia insisted that a ban on job piracy be placed in the 1994 Agreement on Internal Trade signed by the Canadian federal government, all 10 provinces, and the Yukon and Northwest Territories. Though there were other provisions in the Code of Conduct on Incentives, the piracy ban was the only one that was legally binding. But it turned out to be not binding enough.
The United Parcel Service subsidy was subject to a complaint by British Columbia against New Brunswick in 1995. But weak dispute resolution rules in the larger Agreement meant there was no true enforcement mechanism. New Brunswick suffered no consequences, although it eventually got out of the poaching game when Premier Frank McKenna retired. However, since 1995, there have been at least eight other instances where various provinces (Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Quebec, and Ontario) all gave subsidies to companies to move existing operations. One of them, Clarke, Inc., has been featured for years on the website of Nova Scotia Business, Inc., even though it is a prima facie violation of the Code of Conduct. But without a complaint from Ontario, nothing can happen -- and Ontario tried to raid Nova Scotia unsuccessfully to obtain the headquarters of grocery chain Sobeys.
The Code of Conduct does not appear to have had much success. The best that can be said about it is that the relocations subsidized were much smaller than those of the 1990s. Clarke, at 95 jobs, was the largest; the others were significantly smaller than that. In the meantime, the Agreement on Internal Trade has strengthened its dispute resolution process to make violators subject to fines up to C$5 million. It seems possible that a large-scale subsidized relocation would provoke a complaint under the Code.
An interesting contrast is Australia, which has a voluntary anti-piracy agreement that includes five of the country's six states (Queensland is the non-participant). Besides banning job piracy, the Interstate Investment Cooperation Agreement also encourages states to consult with each other when a company tries to play them off against each other. Whereas the National Governors Association says U.S. states have the right to do this, in Australia the states really do consult with each other to reduce what I describe as an information asymmetry in bargaining between governments and companies. Even though there is no enforcement mechanism at all, there have only been a couple of violations since the Agreement was first adopted in 2003. The reason for its relative success seems to be that the five states' politicians genuinely believe that job piracy is bad policy, a view that has been promoted by a federal government research body, the Productivity Commission, for at least 15 years.
The lesson for the United States is that we should try to ban job piracy because it obviously has no benefit for the country as a whole. In the U.S., of course, we have a stronger dispute resolution process than Canada's Code of Conduct does: If Congress passed a law against interstate job piracy, it could be enforced in federal court. The problem is that too many state politicians don't agree that poaching is a bad policy; they need to be educated or replaced.
Job piracy (using subsidies to induce the relocation of an existing facility) is a big problem in the United States. New York City and Kansas City have been subject to repeated raids by neighboring states, and a Good Jobs First study this summer documented extensive job piracy in the Cincinnati and Cleveland metropolitan areas. Two voluntary anti-poaching agreements among groups of states were complete failures.
In the early to mid-1990s, Canada was seeing large-scale job piracy as well. Crown Life Insurance moved 1200 jobs from Toronto to Regina, Saskatchewan, in 1991, receiving a C$250 million loan guarantee to do so. New Brunswick was handing out millions of dollars to call centers to relocate there, including C$11 million to get United Parcel Service to consolidate 870 jobs from three other provinces in Canada. With this background, British Columbia insisted that a ban on job piracy be placed in the 1994 Agreement on Internal Trade signed by the Canadian federal government, all 10 provinces, and the Yukon and Northwest Territories. Though there were other provisions in the Code of Conduct on Incentives, the piracy ban was the only one that was legally binding. But it turned out to be not binding enough.
The United Parcel Service subsidy was subject to a complaint by British Columbia against New Brunswick in 1995. But weak dispute resolution rules in the larger Agreement meant there was no true enforcement mechanism. New Brunswick suffered no consequences, although it eventually got out of the poaching game when Premier Frank McKenna retired. However, since 1995, there have been at least eight other instances where various provinces (Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Quebec, and Ontario) all gave subsidies to companies to move existing operations. One of them, Clarke, Inc., has been featured for years on the website of Nova Scotia Business, Inc., even though it is a prima facie violation of the Code of Conduct. But without a complaint from Ontario, nothing can happen -- and Ontario tried to raid Nova Scotia unsuccessfully to obtain the headquarters of grocery chain Sobeys.
The Code of Conduct does not appear to have had much success. The best that can be said about it is that the relocations subsidized were much smaller than those of the 1990s. Clarke, at 95 jobs, was the largest; the others were significantly smaller than that. In the meantime, the Agreement on Internal Trade has strengthened its dispute resolution process to make violators subject to fines up to C$5 million. It seems possible that a large-scale subsidized relocation would provoke a complaint under the Code.
An interesting contrast is Australia, which has a voluntary anti-piracy agreement that includes five of the country's six states (Queensland is the non-participant). Besides banning job piracy, the Interstate Investment Cooperation Agreement also encourages states to consult with each other when a company tries to play them off against each other. Whereas the National Governors Association says U.S. states have the right to do this, in Australia the states really do consult with each other to reduce what I describe as an information asymmetry in bargaining between governments and companies. Even though there is no enforcement mechanism at all, there have only been a couple of violations since the Agreement was first adopted in 2003. The reason for its relative success seems to be that the five states' politicians genuinely believe that job piracy is bad policy, a view that has been promoted by a federal government research body, the Productivity Commission, for at least 15 years.
The lesson for the United States is that we should try to ban job piracy because it obviously has no benefit for the country as a whole. In the U.S., of course, we have a stronger dispute resolution process than Canada's Code of Conduct does: If Congress passed a law against interstate job piracy, it could be enforced in federal court. The problem is that too many state politicians don't agree that poaching is a bad policy; they need to be educated or replaced.
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